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Book Review:  
Greg Hainge, Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology of Noise. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013, 
296 pp. 
ARILD FETVEIT 
 
Studies of noise are now increasingly called on to respond to the noisy music and visuals that define 
contemporary aural and visual culture. A valuable contributor to such studies is Greg Hainge, 
professor at University of Queensland, Australia, who now has published a full book on the subject. 
However, Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology of Noise, as the subtitle indicates, probes beyond 
the proliferating aesthetic uses of noise, in search of a more primordial conception of noise, where 
noise, nausea and chaos appear to be intimately linked. This conception of noise, which appears as 
much like an anti-epistemology, concerned with the repression of multiplicities grounding 
knowledge production, as an ontology in its own right, draws its main inspiration from the French 
philosopher Michel Serres. Hainge conducts a balancing act between conflicting notions of noise, 
between common sense notions of noise characterizing many of his examples and the primordial 
Serrean notion of noise, but the balance gravitates fundamentally in favour of the latter: an 
exploration of noise as an opening towards multiple potentialities, the non-reductive, and the 
chaotic richness of matter(s) that meaning, closure and order tend to suppress. This balancing act, 
which fundamentally sways in the direction of a search for a primordial ontology of noise, is both 
impressive in its scope and intriguing in its complexity.  
 
Thus, after bringing us “towards an ontology of noise” in his introduction (p. 11), Hainge treats us 
to eight case driven chapters. These are, respectively; on the lack of noise in the presumptive noise 
music of Luigi Russolo and John Cage; the presence of noise in Jean Paul Sartre’s novel Nausea; 
the noisy cinematic horror of The Ring (Gore Verbinski 2002); the noise of a font remediated from 
a vintage typewriter; the implicit noise theorizing in Roland Barthes’s work on photography and on 
the grain of the voice; the noise of David Lynch’s films Eraserhead (1977) and Inland Empire 
(2006); the noisy photography of Thomas Ruff, and lastly; the all-encompassing musical noise of 
Merzbau.  
 
Hainge’s ambitious study provides us with a number of intriguing discussions and perceptive 
analysis of the works he deals with. But he carefully avoids pinning down and analysing his main 
term, “noise”, as to its ontology and tends instead to multiply its meanings. This allows him to see 
noise in more places than most of us, but according to shifting and more or less implicit definitions 
of what noise is. The common sense definition of noise, which may be conceived as inharmonious 
sound or disturbance, respectively, does not interest Hainge much, although it is allowed to carry 
his fine analysis of the vintage font “Moms Typewriter” in chapter four, and keeps emerging 
throughout the study. As noted, Hainge is more concerned with a conception of noise in which the 
term noise comes close to operating as a metaphor for a primordial chaotic disorder, although such 
a bold characterization risks making itself guilty of precisely the reductionist conceptions both 
Hainge and Serres so fervently resist.  
 
The question of what noise is then, works as a driver through Hainge’s book, but paradoxically, at 
the same time, it is the question he constantly shies away from interrogating. He seems to prefer 
brushing us up against it in various ways. Thus, in the conclusion he writes that “even if I have 
attempted here to sketch an ontology of noise, I have…always been aware that noise would remain 
out of reach in some way, that we would only be able to move towards it” (p. 273). Hainge defends 
this result by writing that “if the ontology of noise is relational, as has been suggested, then it can 
never be pinned down to one definitive thing, its points and coordinates will never remain fixed, 
able to be mapped….and will never allow us to believe that we have definitely, once and for all 
contained it” (ibid.).   
 
The informational conception of noise, in which noise is conceived as disturbance, is relational in 
the sense that noise is always noisy relative to someone trying to perceive something else. To the 
listener who enjoys Beethoven on a vinyl record, the sound of cracks on the vinyl is noise. But to a 
listener who enjoys Portishead on a CD, such vinyl noise is not anymore noise, but part of the 
music, because Portishead uses medium specific noise from vinyl records extensively in their 
music. The latter kind of noise, however, which becomes aesthetically controlled, tends not to 
qualify as noise for Hainge, as it surrenders its obstinate unruly multiplicity in favour of meaning, 
closure and order. Thus, following this logic, in his first chapter he provocatively dismisses what 
has been thought of as noise music from Luigi Russolo and John Cage, as their aesthetic control 
does not allow for the more primordial noise Hainge is seeking. Hainge basically concludes that 
noise co-opted by artists for expressive means ceases to be noise. This important conceptual choice 
allows him to aim for the more fundamental, but also slippery, notion of noise he inherits from 
Serres. The choice not only writes off the relevance of Russolo and Cage. It also risks writing off 
the substantial contemporary interest in using noise as an aesthetic device, for example in glitch 
music. By abstaining from truly engaging with such contemporary noise aesthetics, Hainge can 
concentrate his resources on the more primordial ontological noise his book first of all aims to 
elucidate.  
 
Moving to the realm of literature, Hainge finds Antoine Roquentin, Sartre’s main character in 
Nausea, a historian filled with existential angst and plagued by strong attacks of pain, despair and 
nausea. Bringing his character towards the abyss of existence helps Sartre articulate his 
existentialist path to freedom. Hanige finds in Roquentin an authentic confrontation with noise on a 
primordial level, a noise which in its radical opening toward chaos, dissolves order and induces 
nausea. Roquentin’s existential angst and nausea becomes a reference throughout Hainge’s book, 
pointing to the disturbing, but fundamentally rewarding, confrontation with noise as alterity and 
productive potentiality.     
 
Hainge lets the horror film continue the theme of alterity and chaos disrupting ordered lives. After a 
compelling discussion of noisy typography and an interrogation into implicit theorizing of noise by 
Barthes, Hainge moves further into the abyss of noise through perceptive readings of Lynch’s 
Erasorhead and the enigmatic Inland Empire. The opening line of Inland Empire, heard though 
vinyl static, appears to be a radio announcer who says: “Axoon N, the longest running radio play in 
history, tonight, continuing in the Baltic region, a grey winter day in an old hotel” (p. 187). Hainge 
notes: “In many respects, this opening line of the film is in many ways also nothing but noise, for it 
confounds so many different things, remains so ambiguous, resists meaning and comprehension on 
so many levels” (p. 188). Thus, Hainge finds not only the common sense notion of noise operating 
here, but also the primordial, which obstinately prevents closure, meaning and order. It is such 
examples, when noise according to a conventional definition, also carries within it a clear negation 
of meaning, closure and order, that it is redeemed within Hainge’s conception.  
 
Beyond bringing us towards an ontology of noise, Hainge also wants to offers a contribution to our 
conception of the ontology of photography through a reading of Thomas Ruff’s noisy images and a 
critique of Roland Barthes and André Bazin for their realist bent, their underestimation of the 
complexity of the photographic process and the conventional aspects it involves. The critique of 
Barthes and Bazin has some warrant, but Hainge undermines his criticism by rather coarsely 
assignig to Bazin a belief in an “absolute objectivity,” an expression he does not care to explain (p. 
226). Hainge’s claim that the concept of indexicality in photographic theory is misleading is also 
poorly substantiated, and no alternative conception of the causal factor operating in photographic 
media, by which they make visible evidence possible, is offered.  
 
Given Hainge’s interest in matters which ordered conceptions tend to repress, it is only logical that 
he takes an interest in Barthes’ efforts to conceptualize alterity through notions like “the third 
meaning,”1 “punctum,”2 and “the grain of the voice.”3 Hainge is also a very perceptive reader of 
Barthes, as he is of French theorists and philosophers in general, but as with Bazin he also at times 
lacks some charity. He quotes Barthes’ observation from “The Grain of the Voice” that he seems 
“only to hear the lungs, never the tongue, the glottis, the teeth, the mucous membranes, the nose”, 
when listening to Fischer-Dieskau (p. 154). “It is simply…not possible for a vocal expression to be 
produced without the tongue, the glottis, the teeth or the nose,” Hainge counters (p. 156), and he 
continues: “The problem…to phrase it in the terminology of information theory, is that in 
pretending that this is the case, an ontological claim is made about an expression emitted on the sole 
basis of the signal received…” (ibid.). Hainge concludes that Barthes confuses “a subjective and 
aesthetic claim with an ontological one,” but he fails to make it evident that Barthes in his essay has 
indeed made the ontological claim Hainge ascribes to him (pp. 165-7). Thus, it appears as likely 
that it is Hainge who comes to confuse an “aesthetic claim with an ontological one”.  
 
Undefinable, multiple and beyond what words can grasp, noise stands unconquered at the end of 
Hainge’s book, more evoked and approached than interrogated, but thereby also protected from any 
reductionist conception. Hainge suggests that “through noise…we are able to inuit the serial 
relations that link the heterogenetic modes through which everything comes to be in an ontology 
that does not believe in fixed identities, beings and transcendent essence, but only difference, 
becomings and relations. If noise inhabits everything because everything is in actuality formed out 
of noise, then what noise ultimately points us to is the relational ontology according to which the 
world comes to pass…” (p. 14).  
 
Readers interested in the operational powers of medium specific and other forms of noise used 
aesthetically, may regret Hainge’s partial dismissal of this as noise, but in return Hainge offers a 
compelling, ambitious and contemporary pursuit of a conception of noise inherited from Serres, 
applied to a series of works explored in perceptive readings.  
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